[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"content-query-EwW1q9vl1U":3},{"_path":4,"_dir":5,"_draft":6,"_partial":6,"_locale":7,"title":8,"description":9,"date":10,"body":11,"_type":1075,"_id":1076,"_source":1077,"_file":1078,"_stem":1079,"_extension":1080},"\u002Fcurrent-affairs\u002Felectoral-bonds-supreme-court-verdict","current-affairs",false,"","Electoral Bonds Scheme: Supreme Court Verdict Explained","Comprehensive UPSC notes and analysis on Electoral Bonds Scheme: Supreme Court Verdict Explained.","2026-08-11T10:31:34.517Z",{"type":12,"children":13,"toc":1045},"root",[14,22,29,58,63,68,72,78,85,90,142,147,153,165,170,212,215,221,226,313,323,326,332,344,349,355,372,402,408,420,470,476,488,528,534,539,572,575,581,586,592,597,603,608,614,619,622,628,633,641,674,677,683,688,694,706,712,724,744,750,769,792,798,803,806,812,817,822,825,831],{"type":15,"tag":16,"props":17,"children":19},"element","h1",{"id":18},"electoral-bonds-scheme-supreme-court-verdict-explained",[20],{"type":21,"value":8},"text",{"type":15,"tag":23,"props":24,"children":26},"h2",{"id":25},"introduction",[27],{"type":21,"value":28},"Introduction",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":31,"children":32},"p",{},[33,35,41,43,49,51,56],{"type":21,"value":34},"In a historic and far-reaching judgment delivered in February 2024 (",{"type":15,"tag":36,"props":37,"children":38},"em",{},[39],{"type":21,"value":40},"Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.",{"type":21,"value":42},"), a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India unanimously struck down the ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":45,"children":46},"strong",{},[47],{"type":21,"value":48},"Electoral Bonds Scheme (EBS), 2018",{"type":21,"value":50},", as unconstitutional. The apex court ruled that the scheme violated the fundamental right to information guaranteed to citizens under ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":52,"children":53},{},[54],{"type":21,"value":55},"Article 19(1)(a)",{"type":21,"value":57}," of the Indian Constitution and undermined democratic integrity by facilitating anonymous political funding.",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":59,"children":60},{},[61],{"type":21,"value":62},"The Electoral Bonds Scheme, introduced via the Finance Act, 2017, and notified in January 2018, was originally presented by the Government of India as a step toward cleansing political funding by shifting transactions from cash to formal banking channels. However, the scheme's core mechanism—absolute anonymity for donors—ignited an intense constitutional debate regarding voter autonomy, transparency, corporate influence, and the basic structure of Indian democracy.",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":64,"children":65},{},[66],{"type":21,"value":67},"For civil service aspirants, this judgment represents a seminal case study in Constitutional Law, Indian Polity (GS Paper II), Political Ethics, and Governance. It explores the delicate balance between a donor's privacy, clean political finance, and the citizen's fundamental right to an informed vote.",{"type":15,"tag":69,"props":70,"children":71},"hr",{},[],{"type":15,"tag":23,"props":73,"children":75},{"id":74},"historical-background-context",[76],{"type":21,"value":77},"Historical Background & Context",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":80,"children":82},"h3",{"id":81},"_1-the-pre-2018-political-funding-landscape",[83],{"type":21,"value":84},"1. The Pre-2018 Political Funding Landscape",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":86,"children":87},{},[88],{"type":21,"value":89},"Prior to the introduction of the Electoral Bonds Scheme, political funding in India was governed primarily by:",{"type":15,"tag":91,"props":92,"children":93},"ul",{},[94,105,115,132],{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":96,"children":97},"li",{},[98,103],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":99,"children":100},{},[101],{"type":21,"value":102},"Representation of the People Act (RPA), 1951:",{"type":21,"value":104}," Section 29C mandated that political parties disclose all donations exceeding ₹20,000 to the Election Commission of India (ECI) annually.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":106,"children":107},{},[108,113],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":109,"children":110},{},[111],{"type":21,"value":112},"Income Tax Act, 1961:",{"type":21,"value":114}," Section 13A granted tax exemptions to political parties, provided proper books of accounts were maintained and donations above ₹20,000 were reported.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":116,"children":117},{},[118,123,125,130],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":119,"children":120},{},[121],{"type":21,"value":122},"Companies Act, 2013:",{"type":21,"value":124}," Section 182 capped corporate donations at ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":126,"children":127},{},[128],{"type":21,"value":129},"7.5% of a company's average net profits",{"type":21,"value":131}," over the preceding three financial years. It also required companies to disclose specific recipient political parties and donation amounts in their Profit & Loss statements.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":133,"children":134},{},[135,140],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":136,"children":137},{},[138],{"type":21,"value":139},"Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA), 2010:",{"type":21,"value":141}," Prohibited political parties and candidates from accepting foreign donations.",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":143,"children":144},{},[145],{"type":21,"value":146},"Despite these provisions, systemic opacity persisted. Political parties routinely exploited the ₹20,000 reporting threshold by breaking large corporate donations into thousands of smaller cash transactions (a practice known as \"smurfing\"), ensuring that over 70–80% of political funding remained unaccounted for.",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":148,"children":150},{"id":149},"_2-legislative-genesis-of-the-electoral-bonds-scheme",[151],{"type":21,"value":152},"2. Legislative Genesis of the Electoral Bonds Scheme",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":154,"children":155},{},[156,158,163],{"type":21,"value":157},"To address the prevalence of cash (\"black money\") in elections, the Government introduced the Electoral Bonds Scheme through amendments embedded within the ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":159,"children":160},{},[161],{"type":21,"value":162},"Finance Act, 2017",{"type":21,"value":164},". This route bypassed the Rajya Sabha's legislative power to reject non-money bills, a procedure that itself generated significant debate regarding Money Bill provisions under Article 110.",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":166,"children":167},{},[168],{"type":21,"value":169},"To operationalize the scheme, sweeping amendments were made to four key statutory frameworks:",{"type":15,"tag":171,"props":172,"children":173},"ol",{},[174,184,194,203],{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":175,"children":176},{},[177,182],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":178,"children":179},{},[180],{"type":21,"value":181},"Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934:",{"type":21,"value":183}," Amended Section 31 to allow the Central Government to authorize any scheduled bank to issue bearer bonds payable to the bearer.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":185,"children":186},{},[187,192],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":188,"children":189},{},[190],{"type":21,"value":191},"Representation of the People Act, 1951:",{"type":21,"value":193}," Amended Section 29C to exempt political parties from reporting donations received through Electoral Bonds to the ECI.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":195,"children":196},{},[197,201],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":198,"children":199},{},[200],{"type":21,"value":112},{"type":21,"value":202}," Amended Section 13A to remove the requirement of maintaining records of donor details for contributions received via Electoral Bonds.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":204,"children":205},{},[206,210],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":207,"children":208},{},[209],{"type":21,"value":122},{"type":21,"value":211}," Amended Section 182 to remove the 7.5% ceiling on corporate contributions and eliminated the requirement for companies to specify the names of recipient political parties in their financial statements.",{"type":15,"tag":69,"props":213,"children":214},{},[],{"type":15,"tag":23,"props":216,"children":218},{"id":217},"key-features-of-the-electoral-bonds-scheme",[219],{"type":21,"value":220},"Key Features of the Electoral Bonds Scheme",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":222,"children":223},{},[224],{"type":21,"value":225},"The Electoral Bonds Scheme was notified on January 2, 2018. Its primary architectural features included:",{"type":15,"tag":91,"props":227,"children":228},{},[229,239,249,259,269,286,303],{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":230,"children":231},{},[232,237],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":233,"children":234},{},[235],{"type":21,"value":236},"Financial Instrument:",{"type":21,"value":238}," Electoral bonds were structured as promissory notes\u002Fbearer instruments, resembling currency notes, which bore no name of the buyer or payee.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":240,"children":241},{},[242,247],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":243,"children":244},{},[245],{"type":21,"value":246},"Issuing Authority:",{"type":21,"value":248}," The State Bank of India (SBI) was designated as the sole authorized financial institution to issue and encash these bonds through select branches across India.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":250,"children":251},{},[252,257],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":253,"children":254},{},[255],{"type":21,"value":256},"Denominations:",{"type":21,"value":258}," Bonds were available in denominations of ₹1,000, ₹10,000, ₹100,000, ₹1,000,000, and ₹10,000,000 (₹1 Crore).",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":260,"children":261},{},[262,267],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":263,"children":264},{},[265],{"type":21,"value":266},"Purchase Windows:",{"type":21,"value":268}," Bonds were made available for purchase for a period of 10 days each in the months of January, April, July, and October, with an additional period of 30 days specified by the Central Government during General Lok Sabha Election years.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":270,"children":271},{},[272,277,279,284],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":273,"children":274},{},[275],{"type":21,"value":276},"Validity Period:",{"type":21,"value":278}," Electoral bonds had a extremely tight lifecycle of ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":280,"children":281},{},[282],{"type":21,"value":283},"15 calendar days",{"type":21,"value":285}," from the date of issuance. If a bond was not encashed within this window, the amount was deposited into the Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund (PMNRF).",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":287,"children":288},{},[289,294,296,301],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":290,"children":291},{},[292],{"type":21,"value":293},"Eligibility of Political Parties:",{"type":21,"value":295}," Only political parties registered under Section 29A of the RPA, 1951, which secured not less than ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":297,"children":298},{},[299],{"type":21,"value":300},"1% of the votes polled",{"type":21,"value":302}," in the last General Election to the House of the People (Lok Sabha) or the Legislative Assembly of a State, were eligible to receive electoral bonds.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":304,"children":305},{},[306,311],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":307,"children":308},{},[309],{"type":21,"value":310},"Donor Anonymity:",{"type":21,"value":312}," While buyers were required to fulfill Know Your Customer (KYC) norms with SBI, the identity of the donor was kept strictly confidential from the public, opposition parties, and the Election Commission of India.",{"type":15,"tag":314,"props":315,"children":317},"pre",{"code":316},"       [ Individual \u002F Corporate Donor ]\n                     │\n                     ▼ (Fulfills KYC; Pays via Banking Channels)\n          [ State Bank of India (SBI) ]\n                     │\n                     ▼ (Issues Anonymous Bearer Bond)\n            [ Electoral Bond ]\n                     │\n                     ▼ (Handed over within 15 days)\n      [ Registered Political Party (≥1% Votes) ]\n                     │\n                     ▼ (Encashes Bond in Encumbered Account)\n          [ Party Bank Account ]\n",[318],{"type":15,"tag":319,"props":320,"children":321},"code",{"__ignoreMap":7},[322],{"type":21,"value":316},{"type":15,"tag":69,"props":324,"children":325},{},[],{"type":15,"tag":23,"props":327,"children":329},{"id":328},"the-supreme-court-verdict-core-legal-analysis",[330],{"type":21,"value":331},"The Supreme Court Verdict: Core Legal Analysis",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":333,"children":334},{},[335,337,342],{"type":21,"value":336},"On February 15, 2024, a Constitution Bench comprising Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud and Justices Sanjiv Khanna, B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala, and Manoj Misra delivered a landmark, unanimous judgment in ",{"type":15,"tag":36,"props":338,"children":339},{},[340],{"type":21,"value":341},"ADR v. Union of India",{"type":21,"value":343},".",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":345,"children":346},{},[347],{"type":21,"value":348},"The Court systematically evaluated the statutory amendments and invalidated the scheme based on established constitutional principles.",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":350,"children":352},{"id":351},"_1-violation-of-right-to-information-article-191a",[353],{"type":21,"value":354},"1. Violation of Right to Information — Article 19(1)(a)",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":356,"children":357},{},[358,360,364,366,371],{"type":21,"value":359},"The Court ruled that the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":361,"children":362},{},[363],{"type":21,"value":55},{"type":21,"value":365}," encompasses the citizen's ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":367,"children":368},{},[369],{"type":21,"value":370},"Right to Know",{"type":21,"value":343},{"type":15,"tag":91,"props":373,"children":374},{},[375,385],{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":376,"children":377},{},[378,383],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":379,"children":380},{},[381],{"type":21,"value":382},"Voter Autonomy:",{"type":21,"value":384}," Democracy requires informed citizens. Political funding directly influences electoral outcomes, policy decisions, and governmental functioning. Therefore, voters must know the financial sources backing political parties to evaluate their policies, ideology, and potential conflicts of interest.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":386,"children":387},{},[388,393,395,400],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":389,"children":390},{},[391],{"type":21,"value":392},"Not Covered under Reasonable Restrictions:",{"type":21,"value":394}," The State argued that donor anonymity was necessary to protect donor privacy and prevent political retributive action. The Court held that protecting donor privacy did not fall under any of the permissible grounds for restricting Article 19(1)(a) listed under ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":396,"children":397},{},[398],{"type":21,"value":399},"Article 19(2)",{"type":21,"value":401}," (such as sovereignty, security of the State, public order, or decency).",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":403,"children":405},{"id":404},"_2-failure-of-the-test-of-proportionality",[406],{"type":21,"value":407},"2. Failure of the Test of Proportionality",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":409,"children":410},{},[411,413,418],{"type":21,"value":412},"The Court applied the four-pronged ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":414,"children":415},{},[416],{"type":21,"value":417},"Doctrine of Proportionality",{"type":21,"value":419}," to test whether the restriction on the Right to Information was constitutionally permissible:",{"type":15,"tag":171,"props":421,"children":422},{},[423,433,443,460],{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":424,"children":425},{},[426,431],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":427,"children":428},{},[429],{"type":21,"value":430},"Legitimate Aim:",{"type":21,"value":432}," Curbing black money and protecting donor privacy are legitimate state interests.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":434,"children":435},{},[436,441],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":437,"children":438},{},[439],{"type":21,"value":440},"Rational Connection:",{"type":21,"value":442}," Electoral bonds do have a rational connection to curbing cash funding since payments occur through banking channels.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":444,"children":445},{},[446,451,453,458],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":447,"children":448},{},[449],{"type":21,"value":450},"Necessity \u002F Least Restrictive Means:",{"type":21,"value":452}," The scheme failed this test. Complete, blanket anonymity was ",{"type":15,"tag":36,"props":454,"children":455},{},[456],{"type":21,"value":457},"not",{"type":21,"value":459}," the least restrictive measure to achieve the objective of curbing black money. Alternative mechanisms—such as Electoral Trusts (which disclose donor-recipient links without cash usage)—could achieve transparency while limiting black money.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":461,"children":462},{},[463,468],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":464,"children":465},{},[466],{"type":21,"value":467},"Balancing:",{"type":21,"value":469}," The absolute denial of the right to information to voters far outweighed the interest of donor privacy, rendering the measure disproportionate.",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":471,"children":473},{"id":472},"_3-arbitrariness-of-corporate-funding-section-182-amendments",[474],{"type":21,"value":475},"3. Arbitrariness of Corporate Funding — Section 182 Amendments",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":477,"children":478},{},[479,481,486],{"type":21,"value":480},"The Supreme Court struck down the amendment to ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":482,"children":483},{},[484],{"type":21,"value":485},"Section 182 of the Companies Act, 2013",{"type":21,"value":487},", which had removed the 7.5% profit cap on corporate contributions and permitted loss-making companies to donate.",{"type":15,"tag":91,"props":489,"children":490},{},[491,501,511],{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":492,"children":493},{},[494,499],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":495,"children":496},{},[497],{"type":21,"value":498},"Doctrine of Manifest Arbitrariness (Article 14):",{"type":21,"value":500}," Treating companies on par with individuals for political funding was deemed manifestly arbitrary. Unlike individuals, companies exercise disproportionate financial influence over elections.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":502,"children":503},{},[504,509],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":505,"children":506},{},[507],{"type":21,"value":508},"Risk of Shell Companies:",{"type":21,"value":510}," By lifting the 7.5% profit cap, the law effectively sanctioned the creation of shell companies purely for laundering funds and funneling untraceable corporate capital into political parties.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":512,"children":513},{},[514,519,521,526],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":515,"children":516},{},[517],{"type":21,"value":518},"Quid Pro Quo Concerns:",{"type":21,"value":520}," Unlimited, non-transparent corporate funding heightens the danger of corporate capture of policy-making, giving rise to ",{"type":15,"tag":36,"props":522,"children":523},{},[524],{"type":21,"value":525},"quid pro quo",{"type":21,"value":527}," arrangements and corruption.",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":529,"children":531},{"id":530},"_4-directives-issued-by-the-court",[532],{"type":21,"value":533},"4. Directives Issued by the Court",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":535,"children":536},{},[537],{"type":21,"value":538},"To enforce its decision, the Supreme Court issued strict, time-bound instructions:",{"type":15,"tag":171,"props":540,"children":541},{},[542,552,562],{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":543,"children":544},{},[545,550],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":546,"children":547},{},[548],{"type":21,"value":549},"Immediate Cessation:",{"type":21,"value":551}," SBI was ordered to immediately stop the issuance of any new Electoral Bonds.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":553,"children":554},{},[555,560],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":556,"children":557},{},[558],{"type":21,"value":559},"Disclosure of Details:",{"type":21,"value":561}," SBI was mandated to submit full details of all Electoral Bonds purchased and redeemed since April 12, 2019, to the Election Commission of India. This included donor names, exact amounts, date of purchase, and the identity of recipient political parties.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":563,"children":564},{},[565,570],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":566,"children":567},{},[568],{"type":21,"value":569},"Public Publication:",{"type":21,"value":571}," The Election Commission of India was directed to publish all data received from SBI on its official website for public inspection.",{"type":15,"tag":69,"props":573,"children":574},{},[],{"type":15,"tag":23,"props":576,"children":578},{"id":577},"significance-for-indian-democracy",[579],{"type":21,"value":580},"Significance for Indian Democracy",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":582,"children":583},{},[584],{"type":21,"value":585},"The Supreme Court's ruling on the Electoral Bonds Scheme carries deep structural implications for India's governance architecture:",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":587,"children":589},{"id":588},"_1-reaffirming-voter-supremacy",[590],{"type":21,"value":591},"1. Reaffirming Voter Supremacy",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":593,"children":594},{},[595],{"type":21,"value":596},"By placing the citizen's right to an informed vote at the center of electoral jurisprudence, the judgment reinforces the constitutional ethos that voters are the ultimate sovereign in a democratic republic. It shifts the emphasis of electoral reform from shielding donors to empowering voters.",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":598,"children":600},{"id":599},"_2-restoring-a-level-playing-field",[601],{"type":21,"value":602},"2. Restoring a Level Playing Field",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":604,"children":605},{},[606],{"type":21,"value":607},"In any electoral democracy, a level playing field among political parties is essential to the basic structure of the Constitution. Statistics released post-verdict revealed that a overwhelming majority of total electoral bond funding accrued to the ruling party at the Centre, with regional opposition parties receiving disproportionately lower shares. Anonymous bearer instruments naturally tended to favor incumbents who control executive state machinery, creating unequal access to resources.",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":609,"children":611},{"id":610},"_3-mitigating-policy-capture-and-crony-capitalism",[612],{"type":21,"value":613},"3. Mitigating Policy Capture and Crony Capitalism",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":615,"children":616},{},[617],{"type":21,"value":618},"Opaque corporate donations incentivize policy distortions where legislation, government procurement, environmental clearances, or regulatory waivers can be swapped for political funds. Forcing transparency exposes potential links between political donations and government policy decisions or regulatory leniency.",{"type":15,"tag":69,"props":620,"children":621},{},[],{"type":15,"tag":23,"props":623,"children":625},{"id":624},"challenges-and-concerns-post-verdict",[626],{"type":21,"value":627},"Challenges and Concerns Post-Verdict",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":629,"children":630},{},[631],{"type":21,"value":632},"While the striking down of the EBS is widely regarded as a constitutional victory, several practical and policy challenges remain:",{"type":15,"tag":314,"props":634,"children":636},{"code":635},"┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│              POST-EBS ELECTORAL FUNDING CHALLENGES             │\n├───────────────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────┤\n│ Cash Reversion Risk           │ Danger of returning to illicit   │\n│                               │ unaccounted cash funding.       │\n├───────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤\n│ Statutory Loopholes           │ Non-disclosure of donations     │\n│                               │ under ₹20,000 threshold.        │\n├───────────────────────────────┼─────────────────────────────────┤\n│ Shell Company Misuse          │ Ongoing risks of indirect,      │\n│                               │ unverified corporate money.     │\n└───────────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────────────┘\n",[637],{"type":15,"tag":319,"props":638,"children":639},{"__ignoreMap":7},[640],{"type":21,"value":635},{"type":15,"tag":171,"props":642,"children":643},{},[644,654,664],{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":645,"children":646},{},[647,652],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":648,"children":649},{},[650],{"type":21,"value":651},"The Risk of Reversion to Unaccounted Cash:",{"type":21,"value":653}," Eliminating electoral bonds without substituting a robust, transparent digital funding model creates a vacuum. Political parties may revert to off-the-books cash transactions, reviving the pre-2018 black money ecosystem.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":655,"children":656},{},[657,662],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":658,"children":659},{},[660],{"type":21,"value":661},"The ₹20,000 Disclosure Threshold Loophole:",{"type":21,"value":663}," The current provisions of Section 29C of the RPA, 1951, still permit political parties to refrain from disclosing donor details for cash contributions below ₹20,000. This leaves ample scope for systemic \"smurfing.\"",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":665,"children":666},{},[667,672],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":668,"children":669},{},[670],{"type":21,"value":671},"Protecting Donors from Political Retaliation:",{"type":21,"value":673}," The primary argument advanced in favor of anonymity was legitimate: corporate donors in developing democracies often fear political vendettas or regulatory harassment from incumbent administrations if their donations to opposition parties are disclosed. Finding a mechanism that prevents retribution while ensuring accountability remains a complex regulatory hurdle.",{"type":15,"tag":69,"props":675,"children":676},{},[],{"type":15,"tag":23,"props":678,"children":680},{"id":679},"way-forward-reforming-political-finance-in-india",[681],{"type":21,"value":682},"Way Forward: Reforming Political Finance in India",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":684,"children":685},{},[686],{"type":21,"value":687},"Achieving genuine electoral integrity requires systemic, multi-dimensional political finance reforms beyond judicial intervention alone.",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":689,"children":691},{"id":690},"_1-strengthening-electoral-trusts-framework",[692],{"type":21,"value":693},"1. Strengthening Electoral Trusts Framework",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":695,"children":696},{},[697,699,704],{"type":21,"value":698},"The ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":700,"children":701},{},[702],{"type":21,"value":703},"Electoral Trusts Scheme, 2013",{"type":21,"value":705},", notified by the Central Government, offers a viable pathway. Under this model, non-profit companies act as intermediaries, collecting contributions from donors and distributing them to political parties. If reformed to ensure real-time reporting, full disclosure of ultimate beneficial ownership, and proportional distribution, Electoral Trusts can ensure clean digital transactions while mitigating direct donor-party friction.",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":707,"children":709},{"id":708},"_2-lowering-reporting-thresholds",[710],{"type":21,"value":711},"2. Lowering Reporting Thresholds",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":713,"children":714},{},[715,717,722],{"type":21,"value":716},"Following the recommendations of the ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":718,"children":719},{},[720],{"type":21,"value":721},"255th Law Commission Report on Electoral Reforms (2015)",{"type":21,"value":723}," and the Law Commission’s earlier proposals:",{"type":15,"tag":91,"props":725,"children":726},{},[727,739],{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":728,"children":729},{},[730,732,737],{"type":21,"value":731},"The threshold for non-disclosure of donations under Section 29C of the RPA should be lowered from ₹20,000 to ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":733,"children":734},{},[735],{"type":21,"value":736},"₹2,000",{"type":21,"value":738}," or eliminated altogether for digital transfers.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":740,"children":741},{},[742],{"type":21,"value":743},"Political parties must be subjected to mandatory auditing by independent chartered accountants selected from a panel approved by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) or the ECI.",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":745,"children":747},{"id":746},"_3-partial-or-full-state-funding-of-elections",[748],{"type":21,"value":749},"3. Partial or Full State Funding of Elections",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":751,"children":752},{},[753,755,760,762,767],{"type":21,"value":754},"Recommended by various official committees—including the ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":756,"children":757},{},[758],{"type":21,"value":759},"Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998)",{"type":21,"value":761}," and the ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":763,"children":764},{},[765],{"type":21,"value":766},"2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (2008)",{"type":21,"value":768},"—state funding of elections could substantially reduce dependence on corporate funding.",{"type":15,"tag":91,"props":770,"children":771},{},[772,782],{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":773,"children":774},{},[775,780],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":776,"children":777},{},[778],{"type":21,"value":779},"In-Kind State Funding:",{"type":21,"value":781}," The state could provide subsidized access to public broadcasting facilities, fuel allowances, voter list copies, and venue spaces to recognized political parties based on past performance metrics.",{"type":15,"tag":95,"props":783,"children":784},{},[785,790],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":786,"children":787},{},[788],{"type":21,"value":789},"National Electoral Fund:",{"type":21,"value":791}," A publicly managed, transparent pool funded via government allocation could distribute resources neutrally to registered parties.",{"type":15,"tag":79,"props":793,"children":795},{"id":794},"_4-deepening-ecis-statutory-oversight",[796],{"type":21,"value":797},"4. Deepening ECI's Statutory Oversight",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":799,"children":800},{},[801],{"type":21,"value":802},"The Election Commission of India should be granted enhanced statutory powers to regulate political party finances directly, inspect books of accounts, deregister non-compliant or dormant political parties, and impose stiff penalties for non-disclosure or false reporting.",{"type":15,"tag":69,"props":804,"children":805},{},[],{"type":15,"tag":23,"props":807,"children":809},{"id":808},"conclusion",[810],{"type":21,"value":811},"Conclusion",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":813,"children":814},{},[815],{"type":21,"value":816},"The Supreme Court's declaration that the Electoral Bonds Scheme was unconstitutional marks a pivotal moment in India's constitutional history. By holding that the citizen's right to an informed vote outweighs donor secrecy, the apex court reaffirmed the centrality of transparency, equality, and democratic accountability under the Indian Constitution.",{"type":15,"tag":30,"props":818,"children":819},{},[820],{"type":21,"value":821},"However, judicial striking down of an opaque scheme is only the first phase of political finance reform. To ensure that money does not continue to covertly influence Indian democracy, Parliament, civil society, and the Election Commission must collaborate to establish a robust, modern political funding ecosystem characterized by strict disclosure thresholds, digital traceability, corporate accountability, and institutional autonomy.",{"type":15,"tag":69,"props":823,"children":824},{},[],{"type":15,"tag":23,"props":826,"children":828},{"id":827},"upsc-prelims-fact-file",[829],{"type":21,"value":830},"UPSC Prelims Fact File",{"type":15,"tag":832,"props":833,"children":834},"table",{},[835,855],{"type":15,"tag":836,"props":837,"children":838},"thead",{},[839],{"type":15,"tag":840,"props":841,"children":842},"tr",{},[843,850],{"type":15,"tag":844,"props":845,"children":847},"th",{"align":846},"left",[848],{"type":21,"value":849},"Aspect",{"type":15,"tag":844,"props":851,"children":852},{"align":846},[853],{"type":21,"value":854},"Constitutional & Legal Details",{"type":15,"tag":856,"props":857,"children":858},"tbody",{},[859,881,897,928,959,984,1000],{"type":15,"tag":840,"props":860,"children":861},{},[862,871],{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":864,"children":865},"td",{"align":846},[866],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":867,"children":868},{},[869],{"type":21,"value":870},"Landmark Case Name",{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":872,"children":873},{"align":846},[874,879],{"type":15,"tag":36,"props":875,"children":876},{},[877],{"type":21,"value":878},"Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) v. Union of India",{"type":21,"value":880}," (2024)",{"type":15,"tag":840,"props":882,"children":883},{},[884,892],{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":885,"children":886},{"align":846},[887],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":888,"children":889},{},[890],{"type":21,"value":891},"Bench Composition",{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":893,"children":894},{"align":846},[895],{"type":21,"value":896},"5-Judge Constitution Bench: CJI D.Y. Chandrachud, Justices Sanjiv Khanna, B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra",{"type":15,"tag":840,"props":898,"children":899},{},[900,908],{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":901,"children":902},{"align":846},[903],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":904,"children":905},{},[906],{"type":21,"value":907},"Key Constitutional Articles Implicated",{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":909,"children":910},{"align":846},[911,915,917,921,926],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":912,"children":913},{},[914],{"type":21,"value":55},{"type":21,"value":916}," (Right to Freedom of Speech & Right to Know)",{"type":15,"tag":918,"props":919,"children":920},"br",{},[],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":922,"children":923},{},[924],{"type":21,"value":925},"Article 14",{"type":21,"value":927}," (Right to Equality & Prohibition of Arbitrariness)",{"type":15,"tag":840,"props":929,"children":930},{},[931,939],{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":932,"children":933},{"align":846},[934],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":935,"children":936},{},[937],{"type":21,"value":938},"Statutes Struck Down \u002F Directives",{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":940,"children":941},{"align":846},[942,944,947,949,952,954,957],{"type":21,"value":943},"• Struck down Electoral Bonds Scheme, 2018",{"type":15,"tag":918,"props":945,"children":946},{},[],{"type":21,"value":948},"• Invalidated amendments to Section 29C of RPA 1951",{"type":15,"tag":918,"props":950,"children":951},{},[],{"type":21,"value":953},"• Invalidated amendments to Section 182 of Companies Act 2013",{"type":15,"tag":918,"props":955,"children":956},{},[],{"type":21,"value":958},"• Invalidated amendments to Section 13A of Income Tax Act 1961",{"type":15,"tag":840,"props":960,"children":961},{},[962,970],{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":963,"children":964},{"align":846},[965],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":966,"children":967},{},[968],{"type":21,"value":969},"Legal Test Applied",{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":971,"children":972},{"align":846},[973,977,979],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":974,"children":975},{},[976],{"type":21,"value":417},{"type":21,"value":978}," & ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":980,"children":981},{},[982],{"type":21,"value":983},"Manifest Arbitrariness Test",{"type":15,"tag":840,"props":985,"children":986},{},[987,995],{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":988,"children":989},{"align":846},[990],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":991,"children":992},{},[993],{"type":21,"value":994},"Eligibility Criteria for EBS (Defunct)",{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":996,"children":997},{"align":846},[998],{"type":21,"value":999},"Parties registered under Section 29A of RPA 1951 securing $\\ge 1%$ of votes in last Lok Sabha\u002FAssembly election",{"type":15,"tag":840,"props":1001,"children":1002},{},[1003,1011],{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":1004,"children":1005},{"align":846},[1006],{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":1007,"children":1008},{},[1009],{"type":21,"value":1010},"Key Past Committee Reports on Electoral Reforms",{"type":15,"tag":863,"props":1012,"children":1013},{"align":846},[1014,1016,1021,1023,1026,1027,1032,1034,1037,1038,1043],{"type":21,"value":1015},"• ",{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":1017,"children":1018},{},[1019],{"type":21,"value":1020},"Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998):",{"type":21,"value":1022}," State Funding of Elections",{"type":15,"tag":918,"props":1024,"children":1025},{},[],{"type":21,"value":1015},{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":1028,"children":1029},{},[1030],{"type":21,"value":1031},"Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990):",{"type":21,"value":1033}," Electoral Reforms",{"type":15,"tag":918,"props":1035,"children":1036},{},[],{"type":21,"value":1015},{"type":15,"tag":44,"props":1039,"children":1040},{},[1041],{"type":21,"value":1042},"Law Commission 255th Report (2015):",{"type":21,"value":1044}," Electoral Disqualifications & Finance reforms",{"title":7,"searchDepth":1046,"depth":1046,"links":1047},2,[1048,1049,1054,1055,1061,1066,1067,1073,1074],{"id":25,"depth":1046,"text":28},{"id":74,"depth":1046,"text":77,"children":1050},[1051,1053],{"id":81,"depth":1052,"text":84},3,{"id":149,"depth":1052,"text":152},{"id":217,"depth":1046,"text":220},{"id":328,"depth":1046,"text":331,"children":1056},[1057,1058,1059,1060],{"id":351,"depth":1052,"text":354},{"id":404,"depth":1052,"text":407},{"id":472,"depth":1052,"text":475},{"id":530,"depth":1052,"text":533},{"id":577,"depth":1046,"text":580,"children":1062},[1063,1064,1065],{"id":588,"depth":1052,"text":591},{"id":599,"depth":1052,"text":602},{"id":610,"depth":1052,"text":613},{"id":624,"depth":1046,"text":627},{"id":679,"depth":1046,"text":682,"children":1068},[1069,1070,1071,1072],{"id":690,"depth":1052,"text":693},{"id":708,"depth":1052,"text":711},{"id":746,"depth":1052,"text":749},{"id":794,"depth":1052,"text":797},{"id":808,"depth":1046,"text":811},{"id":827,"depth":1046,"text":830},"markdown","content:current-affairs:electoral-bonds-supreme-court-verdict.md","content","current-affairs\u002Felectoral-bonds-supreme-court-verdict.md","current-affairs\u002Felectoral-bonds-supreme-court-verdict","md"]